Using Immigration to (Re)Inflate Housing

Recently read an interesting proposal by John Mauldin:  use immigrants to prop up the housing market.  After all, if housing is deflating because supply exceeds demand at current prices, we can avoid attempting to balance supply & demand via lower housing prices by increasing demand.

I’d read earlier proposals (*) along such lines, but Mauldin’s addressed many of the concerns I had about previous proposals.  E.g.,

Relation of such a proposal to current immigration levels:

I am suggesting we transform the already existing legal immigrant flow, which is going to happen anyway, into a form which helps us solve a major crisis. I am not talking about adding another 1 million immigrants on top of the current legal inflow. Just change the nature of that inflow until the excess housing inventory is settled, and then we can go back to the current program, if that is what is wanted…I am not suggesting we bring in or condone illegal immigrants.

Qualifications of the immigrants in question:

Background checks and references should be required. [...] The immigrant should demonstrate the ability to support himself and his family for a period of time (at least one year, preferably two), including the purchase of health insurance. Cash or letters of credit or other guaranteed commitments would be required. Only immediate family members (spouse and children) would be allowed to come with the immigrant. Cousins and siblings must buy their own homes. The permanent visa should be contingent on not having gone on welfare or public assistance at any time in the past five years. [...] I would make an exception in having 100% financing for immigrants with advanced degrees or special skills, especially those who did their schooling in the United States.

Alas, even given of such details, I’m not sure I can support this.  Which is annoying, since in good times I would probably favor it.  But now, in a time of recession, during deflation of a massive housing bubble?  I’m not so sure.

1.  For one thing, while housing deflation certainly hits some homeowners (namely, those with negative equity, whose mortgages were either always unaffordable, or suddenly become so), it also benefits others (e.g., first-time homebuyers, or current homeowners with plenty of equity who are looking to move).  I’m not so sure we ought to favor the former over the latter.

2.  Then again, there’s also the stimulative effect of massive investment by immigrants in our economy.  In a time of recession.  Something to consider.  OTOH, a “salutary effect on the value of the dollar”, resulting from the FDI attracted by this program, is exactly what we don’t need at present.  The dollar needs to come down, IOT close our trade deficit & spur our exports.  On the gripping hand, increasing exports also pressures the dollar upwards; and private-sector FDI is the type of foreign investment we should want to attract (as opposed to, say, hot money investments in highly-liquid securities).

3.  Re. housing prices & toxic assets – methinks making the latter whole requires more than simply housing purchases at current prices (which is what this plan would entail).  The credit quality of many of these assets was premised on zero housing deflation at the peak of the bubble (**).  Unless housing prices rose back to such peak levels, methinks many of those toxics will remain toxic.

4.  There’s also the (big) question of political feasibility.  This could be political dynamite (in a bad way) for those who support it.  The only upside to housing deflation is increased affordability for (mostly-American) homebuyers.  Importing immigrants to prop up demand (and hence prices) would eliminate that upside, while swelling the labor force in a time of unemployment.  Re. the latter, although sufficiently wealthy & skilled immigrants may indeed create jobs in the long term, unless they do so overnight (unlikely – any such effect would take years, as immigrants invested hereabouts, started new businesses, etc.), this plan will be perceived as basically contributing to unemployment.

The fact that we’re still currently allowing 1 million immigrants is irrelevant to the political feasibility of this proposal, IMHO.  (Are we, BTW?  I note that Mauldin’s only source for this stat is ‘06 data.)  The same political factors I mentioned above (rising unemployment in particular) make me wonder whether this flow is sustainable either – particularly in the country that executed the Mexican Repatriation back in the ’30s.  On the best of days, American xenophobia remains latent, thanks to the Jacksonian tradition.  Xenophobia plus sufficiently high unemployment isn’t a pretty sight.

I find this unfortunate, since I actually agree with Mauldin et al’s take on the potential long-term contributions of such immigrants to our economy & society.

Other thoughts:

1.  Prohibiting rental of immigrant-purchased properties (as Mauldin suggests) would be key to propping up housing prices.  Otherwise, the latter continue to fall as millions of immigrant-owned rentals deflate rents – thereby preventing the necessary adjustment of price-rent ratios down to (non-bubble) trend levels.  However, I don’t see how feasible enforcement of this provision would be – are we going to inspect millions of immigrant-owned homes monthly, to ensure they’re owner-occupied?  Perhaps we could rely on local neighbors to report violators, but this doesn’t work if 1) most of the homes in a neighborhood are immigrant-owned (as is likely to be the case in many “bubble” neighborhoods; and 2) if the immigrant owner makes clear to neighbors that the choice is not between owner-occupancy & renter occupancy, but rather between rental or vacancy.

Then again, this may be a moot point.  AFAIK, foreigners are currently free to buy & rent out US-domiciled housing while they themselves remain domiciled abroad.  So, presumably, this sort of program would attract aliens indeed interested in becoming owner-occupiers who reside on US soil.  Even if such they didn’t live in the houses they bought, presumably they’d be living in a house somewhere in the US; as such, they’d still serve to prop up the overall US housing market.

2.  Even if we were to do this, I’d prefer a more general investment requirement (not limited to housing).  IMHO, we’ve historically overallocated resources to housing (and certainly in the last few years!).  We’d be better off encouraging investment in (say) export industries, or energy independence, or infrastructure than in housing.

Notes

(*) See, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, here, & here, for other mentions of this idea.

(**) See here (355 KB PDF), which notes that Fitch – the most conservative of the ratings agencies, didn’t even consider the possibility of sustained housing depreciation when rating CDO’s.  Also here (2 MB PDF), which notes that the credit quality of subprime mortgages for homebuyers (and hence of RMBS based thereupon) was basically premised on perpetual housing appreciation.

The Backstroke of the West

A long time ago (ca. mid-’00s), in a country far, far, away (i.e., Iraq), I came across “The Backstroke of the West“, and found it utterly hilarious.

Well, this past (Chinese) New Year, an update was posted.  Still hilarious.

Signs of Intelligent Life, Redux

Perhaps I’m just taking this too seriously, but upon further consideration, it seems I have another bone to pick with John Perry’s silly coup idea.  In particular, there’s the apparent presumption, running through the article, that such a coup would be a relatively minor, surgical, “civilized” affair:

America isn’t the Third World. If a military coup does occur here it will be civilized. [...]

[...]

Imagine a bloodless coup to restore and defend the Constitution through an interim administration that would do the serious business of governing and defending the nation. Skilled, military-trained, nation-builders would replace accountability-challenged, radical-left commissars. Having bonded with his twin teleprompters, the president would be detailed for ceremonial speech-making. [Emphases added]

Beyond a perfunctory observation that, “A coup is not an ideal option…”, the remainder of the article is similarly devoid of any discussion of the potential downsides of this course of action.

Color me overly-paranoid, but IMHO, this apparent idea that matters will stop with a “bloodless coup” & “interim administration” is naïve at best.  Perhaps Perry might view such a coup as a one-time thing prompted by an unprecedented crisis – as something that will never happen again (or at least, not until the Right discovers some other President is dislikes as much as Obama). And, perhaps he’s right, and this wouldn’t set a precedent; and both the American people and the U.S. military would somehow forget that a sitting President was removed from office by the officer corps of Armed Forces of the United States.  I strongly suspect, however, that the consequences of such a “bloodless coup” would reach beyond the immediate & obvious.

American civilians love their military. (Yes, there are the kooks, but even they are notable mainly because of their rarity.)  This is true, even though it’s the sort of standing army our country has historically feared.  There seem to be a couple of reasons for this.  First, when civilians look at the military, they do not see The Other.  They see a reflection of themselves – ordinary citizens who have chosen a life of service. But they also love the military because, by and large, they do not view said military as a threat, or an engine of oppression and despotism. Even though it is a standing army, it is a tame one; therefore, Americans see little problem with weapons procurement, military spending, etc., because the idea that such weapons might one day be turned against them is laughable.

All of this would change in the aftermath of Perry’s coup. That historically rare trust between the U.S. military and the American citizenry – now so strong that the prospect of an American military coup is almost never even considered, let alone taken seriously, by either the officer corps or the populace at large – would disappear overnight.  For a large proportion of the American populace, the Armed Forces of the United States would no longer be “our military” – an institution much honored & beloved by the citizenry – but rather “the military” – an organization whose leadership will have demonstrated that it possesses the means (if not – yet – the motive or opportunity) to rob the paymaster.

Such an attitude could have interesting political consequences.  For example:

• Will American taxpayers remain supportive of military spending while simultaneously fearing that those military weapons might one day be turned against them?
• If the (imaginary) threat of Obama-induced gun control is sufficient to keep the gun industry out of recession…just imagine the reaction when a for-real military coup demonstrates that the Constitution really is “ink on a page”.
• What might happen to recruiting, when the military is shown to be both a threat to the Constitution, and a potential means of political advancement?

Moreover, both civilian and military men, however, a precedent would be set, loud and clear, in the political equivalent of bolded caps lock:

IF YOU WISH TO BECOME, OR REMAIN, LEADER OF THE MOST POWERFUL COUNTRY ON EARTH, DON’T BOTHER COURTING THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE IF YOU DON’T HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. MILITARY.

Or, with apologies to Tacitus: “A well-hidden secret of the late American Republic shall have been revealed: that it is possible for Presidents to be made in places other than the ballot box.” (*)

With such a realization in place, how long will it be before interested parties realize that the way to political power lies in courting the loyalties of the military?  The easy way to do this is through bribes, bonuses, etc. Perhaps even a special tax dedicated to the funding of the military? As Septimus Severus advised his sons: “Stay together, pay the soldiers, and take no heed for the people.” Interesting things can happen when politicians place far more emphasis upon the vote of the Legions than of the public at large. It is not much of a stretch to imagine the Legions concluding that such a peaceful robbery of the paymaster is rather more convenient than a de jure coup.

But it is not difficult to imagine military officers, with their penchant for decisiveness & directness, growing tired of the vagaries of politics. Also, the loyalty of a Legionnaire is far more durable when earned, not bought: Bonuses or not, military men are more likely to respect a commander who leads from the front, who cares about his troops, and who’s led them to victory…than they are to respect some @#%$%$# politician. Perhaps some ambitious commander who fits this description, and whose ambitions know no limits, will eventually decide to cut out the middleman? And, what happens when there’s more than one such commander?

Even with “bloodless” military coups, TANSTAAFL still applies.

[Aside:  Seeker312 covers some of the same ground here.]

(*) The original, from Book I of The Histories, reads:

A well-hidden secret of the principate had been revealed: it was possible, it seemed, for an emperor to be chosen outside Rome.

This was in reference to the fact that support by the Legions – the Roman military – was a sine qua non for any imperial claimant after Nero.

Constitutional Coups, Foreign & Domestic

Jonathan Alder of Volokh Conspiracy notes a recent report by the Law Library of Congress, which discusses whether Honduran ex-President Zelaya was legally removed from office.  Said report concludes:

Available sources indicate that the judicial and legislative branches applied constitutional and statutory law in the case against President Zelaya in a manner that was judged by the Honduran authorities from both branches of the government to be in accordance with the Honduran legal system.

However, removal of President Zelaya from the country by the military is in direct violation of the Article 102 of the Constitution, and apparently this action is currently under investigation by the Honduran authorities.

Interesting.  Except for aspects of the military’s actions, it appears the recent Honduran coup was entirely constitutional.

It’s worth noting that, under the US Constitution, there are three modes whereby one might execute a “constitutional coup”.

First, there’s impeachment.  Although, technically, a President can only be impeached for “high crimes and misdemeanors”, there is (AFAIK) no judicial review of impeachments.  Ergo, in reality, “high crimes and misdemeanors” means whatever a majority of the House & two-thirds of the Senate want it to mean.

Second, there’s the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which permits removal of a sitting President given the concurrence of the VP, a majority of the Cabinet, and two-thirds of each house of Congress.  The latter makes this method less preferable than impeachment.

Finally, Congress could parcel out various Executive-branch functions to various agencies whose staff is not subject to Presidential supervision or removal – which basically describes the growth of the “administrative state”.  The efficacy of this method is somewhat limited by the Art. II, Sec. 2, Clause 2’s requirement that the President participate (via nomination) in the appointment of all “Officers of the United States”.

And while we’re on the topic of domestic coups…it seems we (once again) have some Bright Light, by the name of John Perry, suggesting (*) the extra-constitutional variety.  I suppose I could comment on this, but I already did so a few years back – after another Bright Light, by the name of Martin Lewis, suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff place President Bush under arrest.

(*) The original article was here, but appears to have been removed.  Fortunately (or not), both the left & right wings of the blogosphere have seen fit to maintain copies of this particular seditious libel.

Danish Mortgages & Negative Equity

In his new book, Richard Posner (HT Tyler Cowen via Steve) notes an interesting aspect of the Danish mortgage system I’ve previously advocated:

The Danish model has another critical and innovative feature.  Holders can retire their own mortgages by purchasing the same face amount of mortgage bonds at the prevailing market price.  To prepay a mortgage by purchasing bonds, the home owner must give advance notice of several weeks to the MCI [mortgage credit institutions], which designates by lottery the specific bonds to be purchased.  Thus, if rising interest rates or other factors cause mortgage bonds to trade at a discount, home owners can reduce the principal or retire the whole mortgage by purchasing an appropriate mortgage bond at a discount.

Cowen terms this “implicit insurance against the prospect of negative equity in the home”, a feature previously noted by Alan Boyce.

When I first read Boyce’s paper & presentation, it took me a little while to explain – to myself – exactly how the Danish system (effectively) ensured against negative equity.  This post is my attempt at such an explanation.

1.  Recall that, under the Danish mortgage system, a given mortgage is funded by bonds having the same interest rate, face value, & duration as the mortgage itself.  These bonds are “callable“, in that a borrower can pay them off at will prior to their maturity date.

2.  Note that a mortgage’s principal (P1) is, basically, the Present Value (PV1) of a stream of payments (S1) at the interest rate (I1) & term (T1) of the mortgage in question (*).  Of course, if the prevailing interest rate rises to a level (I2) greater than I1, PV1 decreases (and, with it, the value of a given mortgage, and the bonds associated therewith).

3.  However, due to the mathematics of amortization calculations, that same higher interest rate (I2) would also decrease the amount of principal (P2) that a notional borrower (having creditworthiness equaling that of the original borrower) could borrow, assuming the same term (T1) & monthly payment stream (S1) as the original borrower.  This is the mechanism whereby rising interest rates clobber house prices.

4.  Ergo, given #2 & #3:  Changes in interest rates affect the values of both mortgage bonds & houses in the same way, via the same basic mechanism.

5.  Hence, under a Danish-style system of mortgage financing, you’d never have to worry about rising interest rates leading to underwater homeowners (**).  A homeowner’s house value might fall as a result of rising interest rates, but the market value of a quantity of bonds equal to the face value of that homeowner’s mortgage would fall by approximately the same proportion.

(*) This makes sense when you think about it; from the standpoint of a bondholder owning a 100% interest in a given mortgage, the “principal” is basically the amount the bondholder is willing to pay in exchange for receiving a stream of payments – w/ interest – over a certain span of time.  That amount, of course, is the present value of such a stream.

(**) Of course, negative equity could still result from other causes – e.g., localized insanity leading to a housing bubble (and subsequent bust) in a given region.

Random Thoughts on US v. Sullivan

Reading about this incident, wherein Andrew Sullivan apparently caught a break from selective prosecution, brought to mind several things.

1.  Favoritism:  Yes, prosecutorial resources are limited.  Yes, you fight the fights you can win.  Neither appears to be in evidence here.  Perhaps the federal prosecutors in this district have standing orders to seek dismissal of charges in cases where someone’s immigration status is at risk?

2.  Jerry Pournelle’s notion of “anarcho-tyranny“.  It’s not difficult to imagine this sort of prosecutorial behavior developing into a client-patron relationship.  (No, I’m not saying that’s what’s happening here.)

3.  Red Emma’s recent post, which has me wondering whether l’affaire Sullivan is unusual only because some federal district judge bothered to complain about it in writing.

4.  Presidential Pardons:  I.e., the proper way to seek criminal-justice favoritism.  (Not via de facto dereliction of a prosecutor’s duty to enforce the law.)  Were the people of this country ever foolish enough to elect me President, I’d be strongly tempted to start issuing pardons, as a matter of course, to anyone charged with a federal crime which a) carried a mandatory minimum sentence of excessive severity, and/or b) struck me as being unconstitutional.  E.g., all federal drug offenses.

5.  ISTM we actually have two justice systems in this country.  There’s the formal one, with actual civil & criminal trials like in Law & Order and John Grisham.  Then there’s the “shadow” one, comprising (inter alia) plea bargains & probations on the criminal end, and ADR & civil settlements on the civil end.  I really must read about the shadow one at some point.  I wonder what the relative market share is between the two systems….

Grant, Lee, Parole, & Treason

When I first read James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom, I came across this interesting nugget regarding the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia:

The terms [of surrender] were generous:  officers and men could go home “not to be disturbed by U.S. authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they reside.”  This clause had great significance.  Serving as a model for the subsequent surrender of other Confederate armies, it guaranteed southern soldiers immunity from prosecution for treason. [1]

Alas, McPherson cited no source for his conclusion regarding the significance of the clause he mentions.  This provided sufficient cause for me to make an on-and-off hobby, over the past few years, of running down information regarding the legal significance of the surrender at Appomattox.

My current understanding is that there isn’t any court decision [1a] on whether the terms of the Confederate surrenders effectively granted immunity to Confederate soldiers.  However, Jean Edward Smith’s biography of Ulysses S. Grant does contain this interesting anecdote:

Led by the New York Times, much of the nation’s press began a crusade to try Lee for treason.  Benjamin Butler…told [President Andrew] Johnson that Grant “had no authority to grant amnesty” at Appomattox, and Attorney General James Speed, acting at the President’s behest, provided a legal opinion that “the terms of capitulation were strictly military,” implying that they provided no shield against subsequent civil action.  This was the context when, on June 7, 1865, a federal grand jury sitting in Norfolk indicted Lee, Johnston, Longstreet, and a host of other Confederate generals for treason. [2]

Upon hearing this, Lee sounded out Grant via mutual acquaintances, whereby he learned that Grant stood by the terms of Appomattox, and favored pardoning Lee.  Lee then forwarded his petition for a presidential pardon to the General in Chief, who in turn forwarded it to Secretary of War Stanton with the following endorsement:

In my opinion the officers and men paroled at Appomattox C.H. and since upon the same terms given to Lee, cannot be tried for treason so long as they observe the terms of their parole.  This is my understanding.  Good faith as well as true policy dictates that we should observe the conditions of that convention.  Bat faith on the part of the Governm’t or a construction of that convention subjecting officers to trial for treason, would produce a feeling of insecurity in the minds of all paroled officers and men.  If so disposed they might even regard such an infraction of terms, by the government as an entire release from all obligation on their part.

I will state further that the terms granted by me met with the hearty approval of the President at the time, and of the country generally.  The action of Judge Underwood in Norfolk has already had an injurious effect, and I would ask that he be ordered to quash all indictments found against paroled prisoners of war, and to desist from further prosecution of them.” [3]

However, when Stanton – who lacked Grant’s enthusiasm for Lee’s cause – failed to press the issue, Grant went directly to President Johnson.  As Smith tells it:

When Grant when to the White House, he found Johnson unyielding.  The President said he wanted “to make treason odious,” stating that Lee and other rebel leaders had to face punishment.  Grant objected.  He told Johnson he could do as he pleased “about civil rights, confiscation of property, and so on,” but the terms of Appomattox had to be honored.

“When can these men be tried,” asked Johnson.

“Never,” replied Grant.  “Never, unless they violate their parole.”

Johnson persisted, demanding by what right “a military commander interferes to protect an arch-traitor from the laws.”

Grant, who rarely lost his temper, was livid.  He told the president that as the responsible commander in the field he had an obligation to destroy Lee’s army.  “I have made certain terms with Lee, the best and only terms.  If I had told him and his army that their liberty would be invaded, that they would be open to arrest, trial, and execution for treason, Lee would never have surrendered, and we should have lost many lives in destroying him.  My terms of surrender were according to military law, and so long as General Lee observes his parole, I will never consent to his arrest.  I will resign the command of the army rather than execute any order to arrest Lee or any of his commanders so long as they obey the law.”

Andrew Johnson was a stubborn man, but he knew when he was overmatched.  He realized that without Grant’s support his administration would be in serious trouble.  He did not doubt Grant meant what he said, and so he backed down.  On June 20 Attorney General Speed instructed the United States attorney in Norfolk to drop the proceedings.  Grant then wrote to Lee, enclosed a copy of his endorsement of Lee’s request for clemency, and without mentioning his discussion with Johnson, said simply that the government had accepted his interpretation. [...] [4] [Emphasis in original]

So it appears this particular legal question was never actually adjudicated.  At least not in the courts of the United States.  Instead, it was decided by the President…mainly on the strength of an amicus curiae brief filed by Gen. U.S. Grant.

As for Lee’s pardon…that is a story with two parts.

The pardon petition submitted by Lee (and endorsed by Grant) was never acted upon.  Initially, this was because the petition failed to include the oath of allegiance required under Johnson’s initial amnesty proclamation [5].  However, when Lee attempted to correct this oversight a few months later, the notarized oath he submitted got misfiled by the State Department.  Meanwhile, Secretary of State William Seward apparently gave Lee’s pardon petition to a friend as a souvenir [6].  As a result of such incompetence, Lee never received a specific pardon during his lifetime.  However, as noted by the War Department in 1936 (HT Bob Huddleston), the terms of President Johnson’s on Dec. 25, 1868 amnesty proclamation were broad enough to encompass Lee [7].

Even after being pardoned, however, Lee remained subject to the political disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, until his death in 1870.  An Act of Congress [8] rescinding such disabilities was passed in 1898, but since that law “was not intended to have any posthumous effect” [9], posthumous restoration of Lee’s full rights of citizenship required an additional Joint Resolution (passed over a century after Lee’s death, in 1975) [10].

Notes

[1] James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, at 849 (1988).

[1a] Then again, the June 8, 1865 issue of Philadelphia Inquirer apparently carried the following excerpt from Judge Underwood’s charge to the Norfolk grand jury.

To the inquiry which has been made by an officer of the Court, whether the terms of the parole agreed upon with General Lee were any protection to those taking the parole, the answer is, that was a mere military arrangement, and can have no influence upon civil rights or the status of the persons interested.

Simon, infra note 3, at 150.  It’s not clear to me whether or not this charge could serve as legal precedent of a sort.  One of these days, I’ll try & run down a copy of the court records from this case (along with Attorney General Speed’s opinion on the matter).

[2] Jean Edward Smith, Grant, at 417 (2001).  Aside:  I see the rule of law had friends back then, as well as now….

[3] John Y. Simon, ed., 15 Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, at 149.

[4] Smith, supra note 2, at 418.

[5] Proclamation of May 29, 1865, 13 Stat. 758

[6] Elmer Otis Parker, “Why Was Lee Not Pardoned?” Prologue, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1970), p. 181.

[7] Proclamation of Dec. 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 711

[8] Act of June 6, 1898, 30 Stat. 432, Ch. 389

[9] H.R. Rep. No. 94-324, at 6 (1975).

[10] Act of August 5, 1975, 89 Stat. 380.

Reflections on (America’s) Remembrance Day

What was I doing when the planes hit the World Trade Center & the Pentagon?  Honestly…I was asleep.  I’d been up way too late the night before, hanging out with friends while watching “Con Air” for the first time; and, being a grad student with a cushy assistantship, my work hours were a bit more flexible than the standard 9-to-5.  The lady in whose house I was boarding had long since left for work, so I had no notion of what had happened until, perchance, I bumped into a friend in the physics building (where I worked).  As she narrated the morning’s events -  first a plane hit one of the WTC towers, followed by a second plane hit the other, and a third one striking the Pentagon – my thoughts rapidly swung from, “Wow, that’s a heck of an accident,” to “Oh, hell, we’re under attack.”  Then I was on my work computer, simultaneously attempting to 1) gather more info on the attacks, and 2) email my family to let them know I was okay.  I wasn’t the best at keeping in touch under normal circumstances; however, being cognizant of my target-rich surroundings, I figured some reassurance was in order.

Of course, I didn’t get any work done that day.  I don’t think anybody did where I was.  My only other memory of the “workday” was a moment of blinding rage, which in turn bought to mind these lines from “Babylon 5″:

“They deserve no mercy.  Strike them down, follow them to their base and…and kill them, all of them, ALL OF THEM!  NO MERCY!”

Ironically, that recollection served to calm me, as I also recalled the events that (in the B5 storyline) were triggered by that utterance.

Eventually, went home with some friends; for whatever reason, I didn’t feel like being alone at that time.  We watched recycled news footage from the morning all afternoon, while I gradually got in touch with my family & friends.  In most cases, this was routine; but one of my college friends actually worked in downtown Manhattan, and saw the WTC go down.  I was quite reassured to hear her voice….

As for the long-term effects:

1.  Although, intellectually, I’d always understood the importance of the military & national defense, 9/11 brought this home to me.  That said…9/11 didn’t factor into my decision to become a Marine; I’d already decided that over a year prior, and I was simply waiting to finish grad school before enlisting.  9/11 merely reinforced a decision already made.  Indirectly, it did affect the course my life subsequently took, since it’s hard for me to imagine the Iraq war – and hence my deployment to that country – occurring sans 9/11.

2.  Prior to 9/11, my attitude towards the rest of the world was a good deal more cosmopolitan; and I found it easier to see myself as a “citizen of the world”.  After 9/11, my outlook became more nationalist, more unilateralist, more prone to favoring American interests over those of other nations.

3.  My flirtation with neoconservative neocolonialism began soon afterwards.  This was due to several factors:  a) a pre-9/11 encounter with this essay in Parameters; b) the influence of neocon friends; and c) my pre-9/11 belief that the existence of failed states & poverty abroad could be largely boiled down to bad governance.  This infatuation persisted for a couple of years, but started to ebb when I attended several Marine Corps briefings on the Iraqi culture (as a prelude to my deployment to that troubled land).

As for the things that didn’t surprise me about 9/11 (or the aftereffects thereof):

1.  The tactics employed in the attack.  As an avid Clancy fan, who’d read Patriot Games, The Sum of All Fears, and Debt of Honor, I was well aware of the potential threat posed by terrorism, along with the notion of suicide-bombing-via-civilian-airliner.  Indeed, a little over 5 yrs prior to 9/11, I was briefly a member of a Tom Clancy newsgroup, which one day featured an avid discussion of how to defend a city (say, Washington, DC) from such an attack.  Lots of guys with military experience in that NG; and “TC” himself even made appearances on occasion.

2.  Existence of people who hated us:  I’d paid some attention to foreign affairs in the years preceding 9/11; the notion that our foreign policy might generate hatred abroad was therefore unsurprising to me.

3.  I found much of Americans’ response to 9/11 – e.g., desire for retaliation; occasional xenophobia; support for military – unsurprising, given the obvious analogy to Pearl Harbor.

4.  The use of emergency powers:  Unlike most Americans, I’d previously made a hobby of reading about the exercise of emergency powers in previous wars (e.g., Civil War, WWI, WWII), and was therefore unsurprised by the post-9/11 use of such powers by Bush et al.  From early on, my preference was for Bush to obtain Congressional sanction for the use of such powers, in keeping with the examples of Lincoln & FDR.  I found his failure to do so (barely) acceptable, given the possibility that Congresscritters more concerned about civil liberties than security might deny such sanction.

5.  The notion that America wasn’t immune to threats:  I grew up during the tail end of the Cold War, and remember worrying about nuclear war.  The notion that we lived in a dangerous world was hardly foreign to me.  Moreover, while many Americans’ “holiday from history” might’ve lasted a decade, for me it lasted little over a year:  from our victory in Desert Storm, ’till I read “The War in 2020″ (which imagined a world wherein America wasn’t on top).  I walked away from that book a bit less sanguine about our position in the world.

…And that’s all I have to say about that.

(*) Besides the obvious, my use of this term is also a reference to Harry Turtledove’s Timeline-191.

In Re Birthers

While I did encounter the “birthers’” strange notions before the election, a brief visit to Snopes was sufficient to disprove them.  (Whereupon I returned to more interesting perusals, e.g., following the unfolding financial crisis with rapt attention.)

It’s worth noting, however, that questions were also raised regarding McCain’s eligibility under the natural-born citizenship clause…and that such questions (in contrast w/ those surrounding Obama’s) managed to provoke a few interesting law review articles.  See here, here, here, and here.  There was also this this post by Solum, as well as this one by Lindgren.

At first, I found it the law reviews’ silence re. Obama’s citizenship noteworthy.  Upon further consideration, however, such silence makes sense:  Unlike with McCain’s citizenship, which does present some interesting legal questions, the question of Obama’s citizenship is one of fact, not law.  If Obama’s birth certificate is authentic, then there’s really nothing worth writing about.

Aside:  I do find it slightly amusing that both major-party candidates in the 2008 election faced challenges under the Natural-Born Citizen Clause.

Extrajudicial Detention, Real & Imagined

Were I a “man of the Right”, I’d hang my head in shame upon reading this recent gem from WorldNetDaily (HT Jon Henke):

Rep. Alcee L. Hastings, D-Fla., has introduced to the House of Representatives a new bill, H.R. 645, calling for the secretary of homeland security to establish no fewer than six national emergency centers for corralling civilians on military installations.

The proposed bill, which has received little mainstream media attention, appears designed to create the type of detention center that those concerned about use of the military in domestic affairs fear could be used as concentration camps for political dissidents, such as occurred in Nazi Germany.

Since I’m no such man, the aforementioned excerpt instead merely elicits a chuckle or two.  Particularly when one actually reads the text of H.R. 645, and finds it completely devoid of any provisions authorizing (say) detention of civilians without charge or trial, or suspension of habeas corpus, or the like.

Contrast such silence with the provisions of Executive Order 9066:

…by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such actions necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commanders may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with such respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Sectary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgement of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. [...]

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

…or the statute (*) associated therewith:

That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5.000 or to imprisonment for not  more than one year, or both, for each offense.

…or the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (**):

SEC. 103. (a) Whenever there shall be in existence such an emergency, the President, acting through the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to apprehend and by order detain, pursuant to the provisions of this title, each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage.

(b) Any person detained hereunder (hereinafter referred to as detainee”) shall be released from such emergency detention upon-

(1) the termination of such emergency by proclamation of the President or by concurrent resolution of the Congress;

(2) an order of release issued by the Attorney General;

(3) a final order of release after hearing by the Board of Detention Review, hereinafter established;

(4) a final order of release by a United States court, after review of the action of the Board of Detention Review, or upon a writ of habeas corpus.

…or Proclamation 2525 (***), issued under the authority of the Alien Enemies Act:

Alien enemies deemed dangerous to the public peace or safety of the United States by the Attorney General or the Secretary of War, as the case may be, are subject to summary apprehension. [...] Alien enemies arrested shall be subject to confinement in such place of detention as may be directed by the officers responsible for the execution of these regulations and for the arrest, detention and internment of alien enemies in each case, or in such other places of detention as may be directed from time to time by the Attorney General…and by the Secretary of War…and there confined until he shall have received such permit as the Attorney General or the Secretary of War…shall prescribe.

…or the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 (****):

That, during the present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof. And whenever and wherever the said privilege shall be suspended, as aforesaid, no military or other officer shall be compelled,. in answer to any writ of habeas corpus, to return, the body of any person or persons detained by him by authority of the President; but upon the certificate, under oath, of the officer having charge of any one so detained that such person is detained by him as a prisoner under authority of the President, further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus shall be suspended by the judge or court having issued the said writ, so long as said suspension by the President shall remain in force, and said rebellion continue.

Of course, Corsi’s paranoid musings are vaguely reminiscent of those executive order lists that (still!) float around the web, and which purport to have uncovered secret plans for dictatorship in the bureaucracy’s attempts at post-nuclear-warfare disaster-management planning.  I remember once reading one of those lists back in the day, and then being underwhelmed by the actual text of the cited executive orders.  I am similarly unimpressed by Mr. Corsi’s allegations.

Then again, perhaps I’m just overly naive….

(*) Act of Mar. 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173, formerly codified by 18 USC 1383

(**) Act of Sept. 23, 1950, 64 Stat 987, 1021 et seq.

(***) Dec. 7, 1941; 55 Stat. Pt. 2, 1700

(****) Mar. 3, 1863; 12 Stat. 755