Left-Wing(nut) Birthers

Posted in Law, Poli-ticks on 20100209 by Avenging Sword

Via Volokh Conspiracy, I came across this interesting article.  It traces the Birther hoax’s actual origins not to right-wing conspiracy theorists, but rather to disgruntled Hillary Clinton supporters.  Admittedly, I’ve never followed the birthers closely, so I’m not sure if this is true or not.  If it is, however, it strikes me as more than a little ironic.  And amusing.

Though I consider the birthers’ prominence a lamentable example of the ignorance that frequently pervades our political system, it does have a couple of upsides.  First, I suppose the birthers do provide some measure of ongoing entertainment value.  Second, those seeking to debunk the birthers have produced a number of websites digitizing (inter alia) pre-Fourteenth Amendment discussions of birthright citizenship.  I found these occasionally useful when researching an article I’m writing about that topic:  Though good mostly for research leads (e.g., names & dates of court decisions to be hunted down elsewhere), they did also provide me with my first copy of Lynch v. Clarke (the leading antebellum case re. birthright citizenship for US-born children of aliens).

Secession, Salmon Chase, and the Treason Trial of Jefferson Davis

Posted in Law on 20100203 by Avenging Sword

So I was surfing the ‘Net recently, on the lookout for info re. Pius IX & the American Civil War, [1] when I came across a (relevant) page that made some interesting assertions:

Following the War Between the States (1861-65), Jefferson Davis, President of the defeated Confederate States of America, was imprisoned with a view to his being tried for treason on account of his leadership role in the South’s effort to make of itself an independent nation. Two years later, however, he was released and went into exile in Montreal (in Catholic Quebec) and then wandered in Europe before returning to these shores to spend his final days in his home state of Mississippi. His release came after a finding by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Salmon P. Chase, that there was nothing in the U.S. Constitution that prohibited the secession of states. If secession was not illegal, neither Davis nor any other Confederate leaders could be guilty of treason.[2] [Emphasis added]

Despite my dim knowledge of Civil War history, I found the bolded passage rather odd, since even I knew that Chief Justice Chase was not a Confederate sympathizer.  In fact, Chase was a (Radical) Republican[3] who’d been Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary[4] prior to serving on the Supreme Court.  Add in the considerable effort expended by Union men in denying the propriety of southern secession,[5] and it seemed mighty peculiar that a Supreme Court justice would publicly endorse secession’s constitutionality so soon after the Civil War.

It turns out my initial suspicion was correct:  about the only things the aforementioned account gets right are the fact that 1) Davis was imprisoned; 2) the Johnson administration did attempt to try him for treason; and 3) Davis was eventually released.

Among the things it gets wrong:

  1. There were several hurdles to a treason trial of Jefferson Davis.  First, northern public opinion was divided regarding the prosecution of “arch traitors”.  Some[6] supported such prosecutions, while others[7] preferred a policy of leniency.  Second, trying Davis for treason carried the potential for adverse political consequences.  A “not guilty” verdict would embarrass the government; while a finding of guilt would make a martyr of Davis while stoking southern resentment.[8] Third, there were practical obstacles to conducting a jury trial of Davis in war-torn Virginia.[9]
  2. Lingering uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of secession was actually cited as a reason why Davis should be tried.  Northerners who opposed secession hoped that a successful conviction of Davis would establish a judicial precedent discrediting secession’s constitutionality.[10] Similarly, Davis wanted to be tried, since he hoped to use the proceedings “as a platform to vindicate the rightness of the path he had chosen in 1861;”[11] had his case gone to trial, his defense lawyers had planned to “capitalize on the position that Davis had acted constitutionally when he left the Union.”[12]
  3. Although a writ of habeas corpus did secure Davis’s release from military detention, this merely transferred him from military to civilian custody.[13] His release from the latter was effected not by a judicial ruling regarding secession, but rather via payment of bail.[14]
  4. Chase did oppose Davis’s trial, both privately and in his official capacity as Chief Justice, but not because he endorsed Davis’s take on the legality of secession.[15] Privately, he agreed with those in the north who favored leniency for former rebels.[16] Publicly, as one of the presiding judges in Davis’s trial, Chase also favored ending the proceedings.  His reason for doing so, however, turned not upon the question of secession, but rather on his interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s third section.[17] This provision, which barred former Confederates like Davis from holding public office (absent approval by two-thirds of Congress), was viewed by Chase as imposing a “punishment” for treason.  That being the case, a treason trial of Davis would violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition upon Double Jeopardy, since it would seek to punish him again for the same offense.[18] (Similarly, when seeking to have the treason indictment dismissed, Davis’s lawyers didn’t raise the constitutionality of secession as a defense.[19] Rather, they focused on the Fourteenth Amendment,[20] along with general considerations of justice.[21])
  5. Chase’s opinion wasn’t what ended Davis’s treason trial.  Rather, since he and the other presiding judge disagreed regarding whether or not Sec. 3 imposed a “punishment” or a “disqualification”, the case was certified to the Supreme Court.  Before that tribunal could act, outgoing President Johnson granted a full pardon to all Confederates for the “offence of treason.”[22] Although Reconstruction politics kept the prosecution alive for a few more months,[23] eventually the indictment against Davis was dismissed.  It was Johnson’s pardon proclamation therefore, that (effectively) ended the prosecution of Davis.[24]
  6. Finally, later that year Chase addressed the constitutionality of unilateral secession, when he authored the Supreme Court’s opinion in Texas v. White.[25] Money quote:  “The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”[26]

[1] My search also left me with “The Bonnie Blue Flag” running through my head for much of that afternoon, thanks to this page.

[2] A variant on this assertion, to the effect that, “the majority of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court at that time acknowledged the right of secession”, can be found here.

[3] See C. Ellen Connally, The Use of the Fourteenth Amendment By Salmon P. Chase in the Trial of Jefferson Davis, 42 ARKON L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2009), available at http://www.uakron.edu/law/lawreview/v42/docs/connally.pdf (describing Chase as the “sole voice of the Radical Republicans in Lincoln’s cabinet….”).

[4] JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 260 (1988).

[5] See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 302-311 (2002) (discussing Lincoln’s argument that secession was unconstitutional).  For a Congressional perspective, see CONG. GLOBE. 36th Cong. 2nd Sess. 404-405 (statement of Sen. Simmons); also id. at 224-229 (statement of Sen. Baker).

[6] Connally, supra note 3, at 1182 (noting Edwin Stanton’s support for trying Davis); also WILLIAM BLAIR, WHY DIDN’T THE NORTH HANG SOME REBELS?: THE POSTWAR DEBATE OVER PUNISHMENT FOR TREASON 8-11 (2004) (discussing northern public support for treason trials of Confederate civil & military leaders); also id. at 19-20 (discussing Sen. Jacob Howard’s strong support for such trials).

[7] Connally, supra note 3, at 1171 (discussing Lincoln’s preference for leniency towards former rebels); also BLAIR, supra note 6, at 24 (discussing Horace Greeley’s shift in favor of clemency for former Confederates); also id. at 26-27 (discussing abolitionist Gerritt Smith’s opposition to trying Davis).

[8] Connally, supra note 3, at 1179; also BLAIR, supra note 6, at 31.

[9] Virginia was chosen by Attorney General Speed, since that was where Davis allegedly committed treason (while participating in the Confederate government in Richmond).  See BLAIR, supra note 6, at 18.   As for practical obstacles, Blair notes that, in Virginia,

Legal authority was still tentative and civil order was still being restored.  District Courts had not been sitting in the former Confederates states [sic] and did not appear to be ready to begin in the near future.  Even if they did resume fairly quickly, officials understood that it would be well nigh impossible to put together a jury of twelve individuals who returned a guilty verdict.  As in murder trials, the jury in treason cases had to reach a unanimous decision, allowing Davis to go free if only one person dissented.

Id.  See also JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 114-115 (1926) (discussing special counsel Richard Henry Dana’s concern that a southern jury might embarrass the government by failing to convict Davis of treason).

[10] See BLAIR, supra note 6, at 24 (“At first, [Horace] Greeley had been in favor of a treason trial [of Davis] in order to clarify the issue of state sovereignty and secession.”); also id. at 28 (discussing a similar rationale underlying A.B. Brown’s support of a treason trial).  But see also id. at 7 (“Although a significant proportion of northerners believed that secession was wrong and ran against the intentions of the Founders, they did not think that case was solid enough to guarantee the successful prosecution of Confederates in civil courts.”).

[11] Connally, supra note 3, at 1174 n.70 (citing DONALD E. COLLINS, THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF JEFFERSON DAVIS 19 (2005)).

[12] See BLAIR, supra note 6, at 30.  To avoid this difficulty, as well as the possibility of acquittal by a jury of sympathetic southern civilians, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler had previously proposed trying Davis via military commission.  See BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, BUTLER’S BOOK: A REVIEW OF HIS LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY CAREER 915-918 (1892).

[13] Case of Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63, 75-76 (C.C.D. Va. 1867).

[14] Id. at 78; see also Connally, supra note 3, at 1193.

[15] Indeed, prior to Davis’s trial, Chase had ruled that North Carolina’s ordinance of secession & admission to the Confederacy “did not effect, even for a moment, the separation of North Carolina from the Union….”  See Shortridge v. Macon, 22 F. Cas. 20, 21 (C.C.D. N.C. 1867).  Though this statement does not formally condemn the constitutionality of secession, it does hint at such a position.  It also accorded with mainstream Republican doctrine regarding the legal status of various Confederate states during the Civil War.  See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 391-392 (discussing Rep. Samuel Shellaberger’s theory that, although ordinances of secession did not remove states from the Union, they did, effectively, destroy the antebellum governments of those states – thereby disrupting relations between said states and the rest of the Union, and necessitating the restoration of said relations via Reconstruction); also id. at 391 n.88 (discussing how Shellaberger’s thesis gained mainstream acceptance among Republicans).

[16] Connally, supra note 3, at 1185

[17]

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 3.

[18] Case of Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63, 102 (C.C.D. Va. 1867) (“THE CHIEF JUSTICE instructed the reporter to record him as having been of the opinion…that the indictment should be quashed, and all further proceedings barred by effect of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States”); also Connally, supra note 3, at 1166-1167, 1196-1198.

[19] The closest they came was Charles O’Conor’s argument that, since the Confederacy had exercised de facto authority over its claimed territory prior to its downfall, it was unjust to charge inhabitants of that territory with treason for acts done in support of the Confederate government during that time.  See Case of Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63, 99-100 (C.C.D. Va. 1867).  Though Davis’s indictment was ultimately dismissed, US courts rejected the argument that the Confederacy had been a de facto government.  See, e.g., Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877) (“The Confederate States was an illegal organization, within the provision of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting any treaty, alliance, or confederation of one state with another, whatever efficacy, therefore, its enactments possessed in any state entering into that organization must be attributed to the sanction given to them by that state.”); also id. at 177 (“Whatever de facto character may be ascribed to [the Confederate government] consists solely in the fact that for nearly four years it maintained a contest with the United States and exercised dominion over a large extent of territory. Whilst it existed, it was simply the military representative of the insurrection against the authority of the United States; when its military forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with it all its enactments.”); also Keppel v. Petersburg Railroad Co. 14 F. Cas. 357 (C.C.D. Va. 1868) (“The Confederate government can not be regarded as a de facto government in any such sense, that its acts are entitled to judicial recognition as valid.”).  Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. 1 (1868), did uphold the validity of contracts specifying payment in Confederate currency, but only on the grounds that said currency had been “imposed on the community by irresistible force”.  Id. at 11.  Similarly, Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878) upheld immunity for a person who executed a Confederate order to burn cotton, by noting that the defendant “acted under duress or compulsion” in obeying this order; and by analogizing the defendant to Confederate soldiers (to which the United States had granted combatant immunity).  Id. at 607.

[20] Case of Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63, 90-91, 98-99 (C.C.D. Va. 1867).

[21] Id. at 99-102.

[22] Proclamation No. 15, 15 Stat. 711 (Dec. 25, 1868).

[23] RANDALL, supra note 9, at 116-117.

[24] Case of Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63, 102 (C.C.D. Va. 1867); also Connally, supra note 3, at 1198-1199.

[25] Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868).

[26] Id. at 725.

Emergency Powers of the Temporary, Quasi-Temporary, & Permanent Varieties

Posted in Law, Poli-ticks on 20100124 by Avenging Sword

Rod Dreher asks the following question:

Under what circumstances does a government gain power and then voluntarily relinquish it?

…and receives several variations on this answer:

Historically this has never happened. While individuals have voluntarily relinquished power, governments never have.

Having nursed an on-and-off interest in emergency powers over the years, I figured I’d offer a few thoughts. Read more »

In Re RepRap

Posted in Econ on 20100121 by Avenging Sword

This was supposed to be a comment on Geoff G’s RepRap post, below; but it got long enough that I decided to make a post of it instead.  These are my first reactions to the concept:

1.  Final effects depend, to some extent, upon the optimal size of individual RepRaps.  This, in turn, will depend upon the costs (both amortized capital cost & operating costs) of a given RepRap unit, as compared with the resultant savings in labor & transportation costs.

2.  Unless $700 RepRaps are the garage-sized, I doubt we’ll see the complete demise of manufacturing.  Something the size of a cabinet or a closet could probably handle most smaller consumer goods (anything CDs to PCs to books, clothing, computers, tupperware); but larger stuff (e.g., furniture, appliances, cars) would probably keep manufacturing on indefinite life support.  The degree of localization among remaining manufacturers would depend on the factors mentioned in #1.

3.  Raw materials:  Given the increased recycling made possible by RepRaps, I could see raw materials consumption decreasing; but I’m not sure by how much.  Don’t see any reason for increased localization of the remaining raw-materials production, however.  RepRaps wouldn’t affect the distribution of iron or titanium or uranium ore one bit.

[Note:  insofar as RepRap-induced recycling reduces US dependence upon raw materials imported from unstable and/or hostile areas, this strikes me as a good thing.  One less reason for foreign entanglements.]

4.  Transportation Effects:  Ultimate effect on the transportation industry, at first cut, would be proportional to RepRap-induced recycling’s effect upon raw materials industries.  Assume, arguendo, that such recycling is negligible.  (This would probably not be the case; however, such an assumption is necessary to show the dependence of post-RepRap transportation industry upon demand for raw materials.)  In such an instance, even assuming the complete demise of manufacturing, there’d still be demand for the raw materials consumed by RepRaps.  Though there might be some net reduction owing to decreased usage of containers, the amount of _mass_ moved by the transportation industry wouldn’t change by much; instead of moving a mass of finished goods, the industry would be moving the same mass of raw materials.  Net volumes transported probably would decrease, since presumably raw materials would be less bulky than finished products.  Whether (and if so, how much) this would reduce demand for transportation is unclear to me.

5.  Energy Effects:  These would depend on RepRap’s effects on Nos. 2-4.  WRT manufacturing & raw materials, RepRap’s net effect depends on its efficiency relative to current methods of manufacturing & raw materials extraction/refining.  A RepRap-induced decline in transportation would correspondingly reduce energy consumption.  2006 US oil consumption was ~42 EJ (*), of which freight transportation accounted for 6 EJ (**), or 15%.  An improvement, but not revolutionary.

6.  Agriculture:  Unless there’s a food-preparation version of RepRap (ala ST:TNG), I’m not sure why RepRap would lead to increased localization of agriculture.  Regardless of whether the current dominance of factory farming, agribusiness, etc., is the result of regulations & subsidies; or of simple economies of scale; such factors strike me as largely impervious to RepRap’s effects on manufacturing.

7.  Employment Effects:  I’d characterize these as “moderate” (relatively speaking).  According to Table 740 of the 2010 Statistical Abstract, total 2007 US employment was ~213 mil.  Of these, 6.2% worked were in manufacturing, 3% in wholesale, 7.3% in retail, & 2.1% in transportation/warehousing.  Even assuming the complete demise of these sectors (something that, for reasons mentioned above, I think unlikely), we’re still talking about “only” ~20% of the workforce.  Yes, that’s significant; OTOH, ISTM RepRap proliferation would still leave the vast majority of us employed.

And now back to reading about the Emancipation Proclamation….

(*) See Energy Information Administration, “2008 Annual Energy Review”, Table 1.3.

(**) Bureau of Transportation Statistics, “National Transportation Statistics”, Table 4-5.

Modest Health Care Proposals, and for other purposes….

Posted in Links on 20100115 by Avenging Sword

This morning, while haunting perusing Jerry Pournelle’s blog, I came across this Modest Proposal:

The simplest solution to the problem of health care costs is morphine as the only publicly paid for treatment for those 75 years of age and older. I haven’t actually worked the numbers, but from the generalities I have heard on costs of care in the last year of life, that would allow the present health care system to work fairly well. Older people who could afford it might opt for real insurance that they pay for, or pay for their own expenses while their expectant relatives fumed at the expenses — it would make for some good detective stories. The resultant savings — some 35% and more of Medicaid expenses are paid out in the last year of life — would pay for a lot of the health care dilemma.

This brings to mind Christopher Buckley’s recent Boomsday satire, wherein

One generation is pitted against another in the shadow of a Social Security crisis. Our protagonist, Cassandra Devine, is a 29-year-old public relations maven by day, angry blogger by night. Incensed by the financial burden soon to be placed on her age bracket by baby boomers approaching retirement, she proposes on her blog that boomers be encouraged to commit suicide. Cassandra insists that her proposal is not meant to be taken literally; it is merely a “meta-issue” intended to spark discussion and a search for real solutions. But the idea is taken up by an attention-seeking senator, Randy Jepperson, and the political spinning begins.

Of course, both of these were anticipated by a political cartoon I encountered a couple decades back, which proposed controlling Social Security costs by appointing Jack Kevorkian Surgeon General.

In other news:

How to use a starter pistol to protect your cameras.

I’m not a photographer, but I still find this hilarious.

HAMP Modifications & Due Process.

IMHO, something like this was inevitable, given that welfare benefits are already protected by due process.

Why panic about Obama’s Interpol order is overblown.

The current concerns about the Obama Executive Order are about the dangers of unaccountable international police operating in the United States. These concerns are without merit. Interpol staff do not even carry guns, and they certainly do not engage in policing in the United States.

Voluntary manslaughter & the Tiller case.  “It’s only murder when innocent people die.”

Abortion Sentencing & Second-Class Citizenship

Posted in Law, Poli-ticks on 20100105 by Avenging Sword

Some of you may recall that, in 2006, South Dakota passed an ill-fated law[1] aimed at banning virtually all abortions.  Though the scope of the intended ban,[2] as well as its later demise in a statewide referendum,[3] garnered the most headlines, one aspect I found interesting was its penalty provision:

Section 2. That chapter 22-17 be amended by adding thereto a NEW SECTION to read as follows:

No person may knowingly administer to, prescribe for, or procure for, or sell to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, or other substance with the specific intent of causing or abetting the termination of the life of an unborn human being. No person may knowingly use or employ any instrument or procedure upon a pregnant woman with the specific intent of causing or abetting the termination of the life of an unborn human being.

Any violation of this section is a Class 5 felony.[4]

Recall that, for those on the prolife side, abortion is morally equivalent to murder.[5] It is therefore noteworthy that, had the aforementioned law actually taken effect, it would have established abortion as the most lightly-punished homicide on South Dakota’s books.  The penalty for violating that law would have been far less severe[6] than that associated with murder,[7] manslaughter,[8] or vehicular homicide.[9]

One might be tempted to argue that this relatively light punishment is the best that can be accomplished given America’s decades-long experience with the “culture of death”, and that a return to the pre-Roe days wherein abortion was punished as murder will take a great deal of time.  This argument fails, however, when one examines pre-Roe statutes:  While these provisions frequently authorized punishments comparable to those authorized by the South Dakota abortion law, they rarely (if ever) punished abortion as murder.  Consider that, in 1961:

  • In 25 out of the 51 states (including DC), the maximum penalty for criminal abortion was similar to the aforementioned South Dakota ban:  I.e., maximum of 5 years in prison, and/or fine of no more than $10,000.[10]
  • In 14 other states, the maximum penalty was 10 years’ imprisonment.[11]
  • Nine jurisdictions deemed abortion “manslaughter”,[12] but classified it as “murder” only if it resulted in the death of the mother.  Eight others also deemed abortion “murder” when the mother died as a result of the procedure.[13]

It would appear that there was no pre-Roe consensus equating abortion with “murder”.  On the contrary, while abortion was indeed a crime, it was a crime that was only occasionally deemed “manslaughter”, let alone murder.  That many states punished abortion as murder only when the procedure resulted in the death of the mother also argues powerfully that the law did not equate abortion & murder.

The degree of punishment assigned to crimes isn’t solely about deterrence & crime prevention; it also has important symbolic value.  If crimes against a certain class of persons (Class B) carry lesser penalties than identical crimes persons from Class A, such lesser penalties send a strong signal to the populace at large that those in Class B are second-class citizens (de facto if not necessarily de jure) less valuable than those in Class A.  By way of illustration, consider this hypothetical:  we revise the criminal law so that anyone who kills a white man gets automatic execution; but anyone who kills a black man gets no more than a month’s jail time & a $100 fine.  Would this not send a not-so-subtle message about the relative worth of blacks vs. whites?

If all persons – born and unborn – are equally deserving of life, and of the protection of the law, then the law should reflect this fact.  If the law fails to do this – if it punishes some premeditated killings (e.g., of born human beings) more seriously than others (e.g., of unborn human beings) – it sends an important (albeit implicit) message:  That the lives of some people (e.g., the unborn) are less important than the lives of others (e.g., the born).  Contrariwise, if abortion is punished less harshly than first & second-degree murder, the clear implication is that the unborn are merely second-class citizens, whose lives are less important than other people’s.

In light of the above, I find myself wondering about the “end state” sought by prolifers:  Is their ultimate goal a world wherein abortion really is treated like premeditated murder (i.e., a high-level felony, with women who procure abortions being prosecuted for conspiracy to commit murder)?  Or are statutes like the South Dakota abortion ban the end that they seek, and not merely a way station?  And if the latter is so, how do prolifers reconcile such statutes’ relegation of the unborn to second-class citizenship with the prolife argument that, because the unborn are “persons” equally-deserving of rights, abortion is therefore morally equivalent to premeditated murder?


[1] South Dakota Women’s Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1215, 81st Legislative Session (SD 2006), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs//abortion/sdabortionlaw06.html.

[2] South Dakota bans most abortions, CNN, Mar. 6, 2006, available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/06/sd.abortion/index.html.

[3] Monica Davey, South Dakotans Reject Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/08/us/politics/08issues.html.

[4] South Dakota Women’s Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1215, 81st Legislative Session, §2 (SD 2006), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs//abortion/sdabortionlaw06.html (emphasis added).  I am indebted to Douglas A. Berman for originally drawing attention to this provision.  See Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing provisions of South Dakota’s new abortion ban, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY, Mar. 7, 2006, available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/03/sentencing_prov.html.

[5] See, e.g., Stephanie D. Moussalli, Abortion on Second Thought, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1991, at 12, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/12/003-abortion-on-second-thought-5.

[6] Regarding the classification of felonies in South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1 (2009), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=22-6-1 (listing penalties associated with various classes of felonies).  Though South Dakota does criminalize “fetal homicide” as a Class  B felony, this provision specifically excludes “acts…committed during any abortion, lawful or unlawful, to which the pregnant woman consented.”  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1.1 (2009), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=22-16-1.1.

[7] S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-12 (2009), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=22-16-12 (“Murder in the first degree is a Class A felony. Murder in the second degree is a Class B felony.”).

[8] S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-15 (2009), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=22-16-15 (“Manslaughter in the first degree is a Class C felony.”); also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-20 (2009), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=22-16-20 (“Manslaughter in the second degree is a Class 4 felony.”).

[9] S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-41 (2009), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=22-16-41 (“Vehicular homicide is a Class 3 felony.”).

[10] These were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, & Washington.  See 14 ALA. CODE §9 (1940), reprinted in Eugene Quay, Justifiable Abortion – Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 395, 447 (1961); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 448; ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-301 (1947), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 449; CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (1961), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 450; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 452; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §53-29 (1958), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 453; 11 DEL. CODE ANN. §301 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 455; HAWAII REV. LAWS § 309-3 (1955), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 463; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601, reprinted in Quay, supra, at 464; IOWA CODE 701.1 (1946), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 470; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9 (1954), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 477; MD. ANN. CODE, ART. 27, § 3 (1957), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 478; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 485-486; MO. REV. STAT. § 599.100 (1949), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 489; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-401 (1947), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 490; NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 492; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 595:12 (1955), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 493; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-1 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 498; N.Y. PEN. LAW. § 80 (1961), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 498; N.D. REV. CODE § 12-2501 (1943), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 503; 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 861 (1958), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 504; S.D. CODE § 13.3101 (1960), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 512; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 513; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. ART. 1191 (1960) (), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 513-514; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1951), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 517.

[11] These were DC, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, & West Virginia.  See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1960), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 456; ILL. REV. STAT. § 3 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 465; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (1950), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 476; MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. §19 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 480; MISS. CODE ANN. § 223 (1956), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 488; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-404 (1956), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 491; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 502; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (1961), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 504; 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4719 (1945), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 506; R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 11-3-1 (1956), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 509; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 514; 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 101 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 515; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 (1960), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 516; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5923 (1955), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 518.

[12] These were Alaska, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, & Oregon.  See ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 65-4-6 (1949), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 448; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (1944), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 457; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-409 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 473; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.554 (1954), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 482; MISS. CODE ANN. § 2222 (1956), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 488; MO. REV. STAT. § 559.090 (1949), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 489;  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 492; N.Y. PEN. LAW. § 1050 (1961), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 499; N.D. REV. CODE § 12-2502 (1943), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 503; 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 714 (1958), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 504; ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 505.

[13] These were Colorado, DC, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire, & New Mexico.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 452; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1960), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 456; GA. CODE ANN. 26-1103 (1933), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 459; ILL. REV. STAT. § 3 (1959), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 465; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 435.040 (1955), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 474; MISS. CODE ANN. § 2223 (1956), reprinted in Quay, supra note 10, at 488; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:14 (1955), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 494; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2 (1953), reprinted in Quay, supra, at 498.

What Marines & Code Pink Have in Common

Posted in Random on 20091216 by Avenging Sword

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When I saw the second image last year, it got me wondering where I’d seen that line before.  Then I remembered:  aboard Al Asad airbase in Iraq, on the wall of a building occupied by Marines, someone had thoughtfully tacked on a number of Marine bumper stickers.  One of them was similar to that shown in the first image.  

I find myself wondering whether this line first originated among military personnel or antiwar protesters, but I’m not bored enough to trace its etymology….

Statistics + Law =

Posted in Law on 20091215 by Avenging Sword

Having devoted many hours of late to an article that I hope to have published in a law review, I am reminded of a friend of mine who’s already managed this feat.  More than once. 

Her most recent article – on judicial tests for disparate-impact discrimination – can be found in the Indiana Law Journal.  Prior to that, she’d done an empirical study regarding the impact of gender composition on the outcome of federal sexual harassment & sex-discrimination cases at the appellate level.  (If the latter sounds vaguely familiar, that’s probably because it was mentioned earlier this year in the New York Times, its Economix Blog, and (more obliquely) in the WSJ, back when Sotamayor was making headlines.) 

If you’re at all interested in what happens when you a legal background with competence in statistics, you may want to take a look.

Conscientious Objection & the Original Meaning of the Bill of Rights

Posted in Law on 20091207 by Avenging Sword

Lately, my reading has focused on the question of whether the Bill of Rights, as originally understood, established a federal right whereby conscientious objectors could claim exemption from compulsory military service.  My tentative conclusion is that it did not.

Second Amendment

At first glance, such a conclusion appears obvious; after all, none of the first ten amendments even mentions a right to conscientious objection.  Moreover, this silence was no mere oversight, but rather a deliberate choice on the part of the First Congress.  Madison’s initial draft of the Second Amendment actually did contain a conscientious objector provision, as did the version of the Second Amendment that passed the House of Representatives.  However, when the Senate deleted the conscientious objector provision from the House’s version, the House effectively acquiesced to this de facto rejection of conscientious objector rights, by passing the Senate’s amended version.  Historically, then, Congress as a whole did consider, and reject, the notion of constitutionalizing a right to conscientious objection [1].

However, despite its overt silence on the matter, the Bill of Rights still does contain some provisions that could, implicitly, establish a right to conscientious objection.

First Amendment

One such provision is the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment [2].  Although surviving debates from drafting & ratification of this amendment are sparse, and mostly focused on the Establishment Clause [3], this hasn’t stopped prominent originalist scholar Michael McConnell from recently arguing that the Free Exercise Clause, as originally understood, required that generally-applicable laws provide “religious exemptions” to persons whose religious beliefs conflicted with such laws [4].  However, while McConnell marshals an interesting array of Founding-era evidence, he notably fails to cite a single Founding-era statement equating the right to free exercise of religion with religious exemptions.  His speculations regarding the reasons for various textual changes made during the drafting of the First Amendment are simply that [5].  And his citation of Founding-era religious exemptions [6] is unaccompanied by any evidence (e.g., legislative history, public debates) suggesting that those exemptions were enacted out of concern for constitutional obligations regarding a right to religious free exercise, or general concern for religious liberty, as opposed to less transcendent, secular reasons [7].  I therefore find McConnell’s argument unpersuasive.

Indeed, contra McConnell, there are several reasons to believe that the original meaning of the First Amendment does not mandate religious exemptions.

  • First, the usages of prominent Founding-era religious believers suggests that “free exercise” was understood to denote a relatively narrow right to freedom of belief & worship, and the absence of preferences (or penalties) for any given religion [8].
  • Second, prior to the drafting of the Bill of Rights, several states’ lists of constitutional amendment proposals included separate provisions regarding free exercise and conscientious objection.  So also did the bills of rights in severa several state constitutions.  This implies that the right to religious free exercise was not understood as encompassing exemptions for conscientious objectors (else explicit provisions for the latter would’ve been redundant surplusage) [9].
  • Third, during House debates regarding the Second Amendment’s conscientious objector provision, nobody even mentioned the possibility that such a provision might be redundant given the Free Exercise Clause [10].
  • Fourth, although McConnell correctly notes that many state-level religious freedom clauses included caveats [11], his conclusion – that such caveats indicate that “free exercise” was viewed as encompassing religious exemptions [12] – does not necessarily follow.  Indeed, such caveats could also be taken as limitations upon the availability of religious liberty, as opposed to the scope of said liberty [13].  Given the then-well-known history of European religious wars, the Founders were well aware that religion could inspire criminal or seditious behavior [14].  Limiting religious liberty only to faiths deemed unlikely to inspire such behavior was seen by many as a reasonable compromise between the rights of believers, and the safety of the state [15].
  • Fifth, and perhaps most importantly:  In Founding-era public discourse regarding church-state relations, demands for religious exemptions were largely absent.  In fact, “establishmentarians” who supported continued state-level religious establishments frequently accused their “dissenter” opponents of seeking religious exemptions to generally-applicable laws.  The “dissenters”, by way of response, tended to deny any desire for such exemptions [16].

In view of the foregoing, I’m inclined to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause, as originally understood, did not require religious exemptions.  It follows that the Clause did not establish a right to conscientious objection either.

Unenumerated Rights

The other possibility is that conscientious objection was an “unenumerated right” [17] implicitly protected from infringement by the Ninth Amendment [18], and/or the Due Process Clause [19] of the Fifth Amendment.  Both of these provisions were originally understood to prohibit the federal government from violating the “natural rights” of individuals [20].  The question, therefore, becomes:  Did Founding-era Americans view conscientious objection as a “natural right”?  There are several reasons to believe they did not:

  • First, as with the Free Exercise Clause, the Ninth Amendment’s possible applicability to conscientious objection was not mentioned during House debate regarding the conscientious objection provision in the (draft) Second Amendment [21].
  • Second, during aforementioned House debate, Egbert Benson moved to delete the conscientious objection provision, arguing that

No man can claim this indulgence [of conscientious objection] of right.  It may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Government.  If this stands as part of the Constitution, it will be a question before the Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of this militia, whether it comports with his declaration or not.  It is extremely injudicious to intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals.  I have no reason to believe but that the Legislature will always possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left to their discretion. [22] [Emphasis added]

Though the House defeated Benson’s motion, the fact that the entire Congress later (effectively) endorsed Benson’s proposal suggests that a majority of both houses may have ultimately agreed with his reasoning.  This would be unsurprising, given that Benson’s views were apparently predominant among Founding-era Americans [23].

  • Third, during the Revolutionary War, conscientious objectors were subject to violence & threats in Pennsylvania, Maryland, & Virginia.  In the latter, moreover, opponents of conscientious objection explicitly deemed such provisions “unjust”.  Such controversy implies a lack of consensus regarding whether conscientious objection was a “natural right” [24].
  • Fourth, legislatures establishing conscientious objector provisions often did so out of sympathy, or in order to curry votes [25].  Moreover, the colonial/Revolutionary-era pacifists seeking such provisions did not demand such exemptions as a matter of right, but rather, basically, “begged for mercy” [26].
  • Fifth, although several state constitutions included a right to conscientious objection [27]; and a few other state ratification conventions had included such a right in their proposed amendments to the federal constitution [28]; at most, this suggests that some states considered conscientious objection worthy of constitutional protection.  However, this doesn’t mean conscientious objection was viewed as being a natural right; in the Founding era, rights protected by constitutions were not necessarily synonymous with “natural rights” [29].

In view of the above, it seems unlikely that the Founding generation generally considered conscientious objection to be a natural right.  As such, conscientious objection was probably not originally understood to be protected by either the Fifth or Ninth Amendment.

Conscientious Objection & War Tax Resistance

Though conscientious objection has largely been a dead issue since the demise of the conscription in 1973, so-called “war tax resisters” have recently suggested that the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment protects a right to avoid paying taxes associated with the support of warfare [30].  This argument cites Randy Barnett & other scholars, in combination with Founding-era state constitutions that established conscientious objector rights.  However, as previously noted, it is unlikely that the Ninth Amendment was originally understood to protect an unenumerated right of conscientious objectors to exemptions from compulsory military service [31].

Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that state constitutional provisions & proposals did reflect a Founding-era consensus regarding the propriety & scope of a natural right to conscientious objection; and that, therefore, the Ninth Amendment did protect such a right; the fact remains that, in the Founding era, then-extant formulations of a constitutional right to conscientious objection – in state constitutions, in Ratification-era state amendment proposals, and in the draft Second Amendment proposed by the House of Representatives – nevertheless conceded the propriety of financially-burdening conscientious objectors to support a war effort [32].  As such, it seems likely if original meaning of the Ninth Amendment did protect a right to conscientious objection, the right thereby protected would have been the one recited in the aforementioned provisions & proposals:  I.e., a right to exemption from bearing arms in person, conditional upon provision of a substitute or payment of a legislatively-determined tax.  In which case, even a Ninth Amendment originally understood to protect conscientious objection would not protect a right to exemption from paying war-related taxes.

Notes:

[1] The final House draft of the Second Amendment read:

A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the People, being the best security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms, shall not e infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.

See Neil H. Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights:  The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins, at 173 (1997).

For accounts of this aspect of the Second Amendment’s drafting, see Vincent Phillip Munoz, “The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause:  The Evidence From the First Congress”, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y. 1083, 1109-1117 (2008); and Ellis M. West, “The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America:  The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription”, 10 J.L. & Relig. 367, 395-396 (1994).

The House’s de facto acquiescence to the Senate’s deletion of a conscientious objector right stands in notable contrast to an incident where the House did stand up to the Senate – regarding the relatively minor constitutional question of whether the President could unilaterally remove executive officers.  See Sai Prakash, “New Light on the Decision of 1789“, ExpressO (2005), pp. 37-39.  Available at: http://works.bepress.com/sai_prakash/3.

[2] U.S. Const. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;”).

[3] Munoz, supra note 1, at 1100-1109; McConnell, infra note 4, at 1481.

[4] Michael W. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion”, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1989-1990)

[5] McConnell, supra note 4, at 1488-1500.

[6] McConnell, supra note 4, at 1466-1473.

[7] The military rationale for excluding conscientious objectors is obvious:  Men unwilling to fight are less likely to make good warriors.  Exemptions from oaths (e.g., in court) could be justified as promoting the rule of law, by (effectively) permitting nonjurors to give testimony, etc., in court (and hence avail themselves of protection of the laws for persons & property).  Other possible explanations include sympathy, or simply currying votes from those who stand to benefit from religious exemptions.

[8] See, generally, Chester J. Antieau, Rights of Our Fathers, at 25-54 (1968) In particular, the Founders understood religious liberty to encompass:

  • No restriction upon political participation via religious tests (“The American Founding Fathers frequently understood that the natural right of religious liberty embraced the precept that no citizen should be rendered ineligible for public office or for voting solely because of his religious beliefs.” Id at 25);
  • No compelled religious observance (“The American community in the last quarter of the eighteenth century believed that the natural right we know as religious liberty did not permit compelled religious observance.” Id at 31);
  • No taxation to support a church whose tenets one does not espouse (“[A] majority of the [Framing generation probably] accepted the view that freedom of religion does not permit a man to be taxed by the state for the support of a church in whose tenets he does not believe.” Id at 32);
  • No religious establishment or other preferences for a particular religion (“[The Founding generation] inevitably comprehended that an establishment or preference was violative of natural right for the good reason that it denied equality of religious right.” Id at 40);
  • Freedom of conscience / no legal penalties for religious belief (“Our ancestors of 1776-1800 who believed in freedom of religion as a natural right generally understood that all dissident believers were to…be free to remain in the community without danger of imprisonment or threat of banishment because of their beliefs.” Id at 44);
  • The right to preach & worship publicly (“Principally all the natural right jurists of the American Revolution granted that freedom of religion…embraced the right to worship publicly.” Id at 48);

See also Philip A. Hamburger, “A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective”, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915, 933 n. 80, 934 n. 83, & 935 n. 84 (1992) (citing sources wherein “exercise” refers to belief & worship).

In fairness, it should be noted that, during debate regarding conscientious objector exemptions in the Militia Act of 1792, Rep. Aedanus Burke opposed conditioning such exemptions upon payment of a commutation fee, by complaining that “[W]e are going to make a respectable class of citizens pay for a right to a free exercise of their religious principles….” See 2 Annals of Cong. 1865 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1834) (hereinafter Annals).  It is not clear, however, whether Burke’s usage of “free exercise” was widely shared in the Founding era.

[9] Munoz, supra note 1, at 1118-1119.  Though one might argue, as McConnell does, that separate conscientious objector provisions were included “out of an abundance of caution”, such an argument necessarily implies serious doubt that free exercise would be interpreted (e.g., by judges) as encompassing conscientious objection.  Such doubt, in turn, implies the absence of a Founding-era consensus equating free exercise with religious exemptions.  See West, supra note 1, at 398-399.

[10] Munoz, supra note 1, at 1118-1119; Hamburger, supra note 8, at 928.

[11] McConnell, supra note 4, at 1456-1458; also id, at 1457 n. 242.  Georgia 1777 provision is particularly notable for its similarity to the federal Free Exercise Clause:

All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it not be repugnant to the peace and safety of the state….

GA. Const of 1777, Art. LVI, reprinted in Benjamin Poore, ed., 1 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United States, at 377, 383 (1878) (hereinafter Federal and State Constitutions).

[12] McConnell, supra note 4, at 1459-1466.

[13] Hamburger, supra note 8, at 919-926 (noting the existence of similar caveats in clauses addressing equality of believers’ rights).

[14] Philip A. Hamburger, “More is Less”, 90 Va. L. Rev. 835, 838-841 (2004) (“Certainly, in the seventeenth century, religious belief-whether Protestant or Catholic-had stimulated many of England’s troubles. Accordingly, in the late seventeenth century, when the government recognized that religious diversity was unavoidable, it offered not an unqualified religious liberty, but a toleration that was subject to conditions – caveats by which the government could punish beliefs that tended to undermine civil society.”).

[15] Hamburger, supra note 14, at 841 (“[M]any American constitutions conditioned religious liberty on the interests of government, and they thereby carefully preserved the possibility that government could penalize dangerous belief.”).

[16] Hamburger, supra note 8, at 941-945, and particularly 941 n. 107, 942 n. 111, & 943 n. 112.

[17] Such an argument was previously advanced, albeit on non-originalist grounds, during the Vietnam War.  See, e.g., J. Michael Hennigan, “In Defense of the Conscientious Objector:  The Constitutional Right to a Trial De Novo”,11 Ariz. L. Rev. 249, 264 (1969) (“The stated concern of the First Congress for the right of conscientious objection suggests that it was among the rights sought to be silently protected by the ninth amendment”); Kenneth R. Feinberg & Norman Redlich, “Individual Conscience and the Selective Conscientious Objector:  The Right Not to Kill”, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 875, 888-897 (1969) (arguing a right to selective conscientious objection may be derived from the First, Fifth, & Thirteenth Amendments, in combination with the Ninth Amendment); Ruth C. Silvan, “The Constitution, The Conscientious Objector, and the ‘Just’ War”, 75 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 59-60 (1970-1971) (“The mere fact that the right not to kill is not expressly enumerated does not deny or disparage that right.  The ninth amendment’s clear purpose is to preclude a narrow interpretation of enumerated rights and to preclude them from being an exclusive catalog of rights.”).

[18] U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).

[19] U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law….”).

[20] Regarding the Ninth Amendment, see Randy Barnett, “The Ninth Amendment:  It Means What It Says”, 85 Tex. L. R. 1, 80 (2006) (“The Ninth Amendment prohibits constitutional constructions…that infringe upon the unenumerated, natural, and individual rights retained by the people.”); and Kurt Lash, “A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment,” 60 Stan. L. Rev. 895 (2008).  Regarding the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, “An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment”, 58 Emory L. J. 585, 669 (2009) (“On balance, the historical evidence shows that one widespread understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 1791 included judicial recognition and enforcement of unenumerated natural and customary rights against congressional action.”).

[21] See 1 Annals, at 777-780, 795-796.

[22] 1 Annals, at 780.

[23] Antieau, supra note 8, at 53-54 (“It cannot be affirmed from the materials now extant that the majority of the Founding Fathers of the Revolutionary generation accepted as of natural right the claim of conscientious objectors to be free from military service.  Probably more representative of his age was Representative Egbert Benson who said on the floor of the First Congress while discussing this claim:  ‘It may be a religious persuasion but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Government.’” (footnotes omitted)).

[24] Hamburger, supra note 8, at 929 n. 65.

[25] West, supra note 1, at 376-377.

[26] West, supra note 1, at 378-379.

[27] See Delaware Declaration of Rights, 1776, Sec. 10:

…Nor can any man that is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms in any case be justly compelled thereto if he will pay such equivalent.

DE. Const. of 1776, Sec. 10, reprinted in Richard L. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties, at 339 (1959).

Pennsylvania:

…Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent….

PA. Const. of 1776, Art. VIII, reprinted in 2 The Federal and State Constitutions, at 1540, 1541.

New Hampshire:

No person who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto, provided he will pay an equivalent.

N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. I, Art. XIII, reprinted in 2 Federal and State Constitutions, at 1280, 1281.

New York:

That all such of the inhabitants of this State being of the people called Quakers as, from scruples of conscience, may be averse to the bearing of arms, be therefrom excused by the legislature; and do pay to the State such sums of money, in lieu of their personal service, as the same; may, in the judgment of the legislature, be worth.

N.Y. Const. of 1777, Art. XL, reprinted in 2 Federal and State Constitutions, at 1328, 1339.

Vermont:

…nor can any man, who is Conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent….

VT. Const. of 1786, Ch. I, Art. X, reprinted in 2 Federal and State Constitutions, at 1866, 1868.

[28] Rhode Island proposed the following amendment:

That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.

See Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, at 335 (1836).  [Hereinafter, Elliot's Debates.]  So also did Virginia & North Carolina.  See 3 Elliot’s Debates, at 659 (Virginia); and 2 Elliot’s Debates, at 244 (North Carolina).  Minorities at Pennyslvania & Maryland also proposed conscientious objector amendments.  See Munoz, supra note 1, at 1111 n. 143.  The Pennsylvania minority’s amendment didn’t mention conscientious objection; but it did mention the “right of conscience”, and prohibited federal infringement of state constitutional rights to religious liberty.  See id.  The Maryland minority’s proposal read:

That no person, conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms in any case, shall be compelled personally to serve as a soldier.

2 Elliot’s Debates, at 553.

[29] See Barnett, supra note 20, at 33-34 (noting how Madison distinguished between natural rights on the one hand, and positive rights (e.g., trial by jury) established by constitutions).

[30] See Petition for Certiorari in Jenkins v. Commission of Internal Revenue Service, No. 06-1624, at 14-20 (2007) (“[T]he individual right of religious conscience not to be compelled to participate in or support military activity was well recognized at the founding of this nation. [...] Accordingly, there is a substantial basis to conclude that a right of conscience not to be compelled to participate in warfare was ‘retained by the people’ from before the founding of the federal government.”).  Apparently Jenkins also made a Ninth Amendment argument at the circuit court level, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on existing precedent.  See Jenkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 483 F.3d 90, 92-93 (2007) (“The [Ninth Amendment] argument [made by Jenkins] is squarely foreclosed…by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lee.”).

[31] See supra notes 20-29, & accompanying text.

[32] See supra notes 1 & 27-28.  Pacifists understandably (albeit unsuccessfully) objected to the existence of such conditions.  See, e.g., supra note 22, (statement of Representative Sherman, who noted that, “It is well known that those who are religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, are equally scrupulous of getting substitutes or paying an equivalent. Many of them would rather die than do either one or the other….”).

Although the House’s final draft of the Second Amendment doesn’t explicitly mention substitutes or equivalents, it does end with “in person”.  This latter phrase was added after Reps. Jackson, Smith, & Scott objected that the conscientious objector provision then under discussion, “but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms”, arguably prohibited Congress from conditioning conscientious objection upon payment of equivalents or provision of a substitute.  See Munoz, supra note 1, at 1112-1115.  It therefore seems likely that “in person” was added to assuage these concerns; and that, as such, the House’s final draft of the Second Amendment was originally understood to permit substitutes or equivalents.  The same could be said of the conscientious objection proposal of the Maryland minority, given its inclusion of the adverb “personally”.  See supra note 28.

Freedom Costs a Buck-Oh-Five

Posted in Law, Poli-ticks on 20091114 by Avenging Sword

My reaction to the recent Ft. Hood shootings:  freedom isn’t free.  Or, as was noted in “The American President”, civil liberties sometimes come with a price tag attached.  The liberties I’m thinking of here are religious freedom, and the right to keep & bear arms.

Regarding religious liberty:  The Founders were actually quite familiar with the notion that religious beliefs might inspire believers to criminal or seditious behavior.  Recall that Europe had been wracked by religious wars, and that England had had a long history of fearing (actual or purported) sedition from Catholics.  It was for this reason that many early predecessors of the Free Exercise Clause were conditional:  they extended religious liberty only to faiths that “did not disturb the public peace” (New Hampshire, 1784), or “justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State” (New York, 1777), or were “not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State” (Georgia, 1777), so as to permit denial of such liberty to faiths that did not meet such criteria (*).  However, rather than mimic (say) Georgia’s religious liberty provision, the federal Free Exercise clause contained no such caveats or limitations; rather, it extended religious liberty to all faiths.  Though it’s tempting to argue that such silence actually includes some implicit exemption for “seditious religions”, it seems to me that the Framers knew quite well how to include such an exemption if so inclined:  state constitutions provided several examples.  For better or worse, they didn’t, and so we’re stuck with our current Free Exercise Clause – a provision that implicitly accepts the possibility that religions will inspire violence, and grants them rights nonetheless.

As for the right to keep & bear arms:  Though RKBA advocates are fond of quoting Heinlein’s dictum, “an armed society is a polite society”, in fact, this statement only applies if gun ownership is generally confined to those capable of wielding firearms responsibly (e.g., only in defense of self or others), and kept out of the hands of criminals, traitors, terrorists, etc.  (Of course, it’s easier to do this for some (e.g., persons w/ criminal records or adjudged mentally unstable) than others (e.g., Islamist terrorists in a society that prides itself on freedom of religion).)  Moreover, if a sufficiently large & cohesive minority within a society disagrees with the larger society regarding when it’s okay for private citizens to use force (consider, e.g., a nation with significant proportions of Islamists on the one hand, and Christian theocrats on the other), promoting widespread firearms ownership is less likely to produce civil peace than grease the wheels for the eventual civil war.

IMHO, Yglesias is right, when he suggests that incidents like the Fort Hood shooting are, to some extent, are the price we pay for the benefits of living in an armed society.  Intellectually-honest gun-rights advocates will acknowledge this:  that, while laws excluding criminals, the mentally unstable, etc., might help, nothing short of confiscation (& totalitarian enforcement thereof) will reliably prevent the occasional mass shooting.  From time to time, some nut will get their hands on a gun, and this sort of incident will result.  So long as the nuts, criminals, etc., comprise a relatively small proportion of society, this price will likely remain within acceptable limits; but it will not be non-zero.

 

(*) I’m indebted to Phillip Hamburger for noting this point.  See Philip A. Hamburger, “A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective”, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915, 918-926 (1992); and Philip A. Hamburger, “More is Less”, 90 Va. L. Rev. 835, 838-841 (2004).